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Identity and meaningful/meaningless work  
Nancy Harding  
 
My work for the past 20 years has been located, loosely, in a rather amorphous area 
of academic thought, critical management studies (CMS) (see Fournier and Grey, 
2000, for a definition and discussion). It shares its roots with Labour Process Theory 
in the seminal work of the journalist, Harry Braverman (1974). Braverman argued 
that Taylor’s instigation of what would become time-and-motion management 
processes heralded an era of ever-tighter control over workers. Braverman’s 
analysis, although later criticised for its failure to allow room for resistance 
(Meiksins, 1994), implied that all meaning had been taken out of work. CMS shares 
with Labour Process Theory an intense interest in control and resistance, such that 
these are the fracture lines around which CMS is organised (Mumby, 2005). But CMS 
understands that regimes of control have expanded beyond Taylor’s attempts to 
control bodies, so that now control is sought through the manipulation of minds and 
psyches. This is argued, most influentially, in a seminal paper by Alvesson and 
Willmott (2002), that explores managerial control through the manipulation of 
one’s very identity. Perhaps an ultimate form of control is achieved when the selves 
of staff members are constituted to a design defined by management, one that is to 
be achieved through ‘identity work’ and that will result in staff investing in their 
own domination. 
There is little room for analyses of ‘meaningful work’ in such a location. A vast body 
of literature has explored resistance against management’s colonializing imperative 
(see Mumby et al, 2017, for a discussion), and it could be argued that notions of 
meaningful work are implicit in that literature. However, such an argument is 
tangential at best, especially as CMS has been accused of knowing what it is against 
rather than what it is for. That is, it is against managerialism, defined as a system of 
beliefs that conceives of the impossibility of there being any form of organization 
without managers in charge (Pollitt, 1990; Parker, 2002a). This elevation of the 
manager requires that staff subordinate their agency, intellect, professionalism and 
rights over the job to management’s theories of how things should be done. It 
implies the proletarianisation of everyone except management, with ‘work’ being 
restricted to the sole end of achieving organizational objectives.  This suggests work 
is becoming ever more meaningless, any identity save that of a subordinated, 
abjected other increasingly impossible. Meaningful work, the forms that meaningful 
work might take, strategies designed for developing meaningful work, and identities 
constituted through work that is ‘meaningful’ sit uneasily, if at all, in such a 
disciplinary perspective. 
In sum, CMS seems to offer critique but perhaps little more than that so my task of 
thinking through what meaningful work might mean and its implications for identity 
construction has no obvious starting place. There is little exploration by critical 
scholars of the sort of workplace identities that could be developed if resistance 
were to work, control to fail, management to be ousted and meaningful work thus 
become possible. There is no answer to the question: what form would such work 
take and what identities would be made possible through undertaking that work? 
Thirty years ago, perhaps, there was an assumption that, following a Marxist 
revolution, ownership of the means of production would be returned to the workers, 
implying that ownership equated with meaningful work. This is patently too 
simplistic an assumption and this body of theory has long been discredited, as has 
the search for some form of organizational utopia (Parker, 2002b). The concept of 
meaningful work (identities) therefore remains unexplored.    
Indeed, as implied above, the notion of meaningful work may be difficult for critical 
managerial thinkers to contemplate: if work is meaningful to people, does it not 
open them further to exploitation through management control? Academics, for 
example, often claim to love their work (Knights and Clarke, 2004; Harding, Ford 
and Gough, 2010): does this love of our work render us more open to exploitation 
because of our fear of losing not just our means of earning a living, but that which 
gives life meaning, and us, the workers, an identity? Further, if people claimed to 
gain meaning from their work, critical thinkers would ask if this was a result of 
management’s subtle mechanisms of persuasion that encourage them to profess 
that their work is fulfilling. Fulfilling, meaningful work could be regarded as another 
form of control designed by management with the aim of pacifying the workforce 
through persuading it that it is contented. 
The task of thinking through ‘meaningful work’ and the identities that could be 
made possible through constituting one’s self as someone engaged in such work is, 
from a critical management perspective, one fraught with empirical, practical and 
conceptual difficulties.  
In my own work (Harding, 2013) I distinguished between labour and work. I argued 
that the former refers to the doing of the tasks that the job requires of us. It provides 
a wage or salary. The latter, on the other hand, affords the possibility of constituting 
an identity, a sense of self. I argued that organizations murder the me’s that might 
have been. This argument emerged from a simple everyday observation, of hearing, 
over and over, a question addressed to children: what do you want to be when you 
grow up? In an era of neoliberalist capitalism, when the self is a project to be 
worked on, this question contains within itself another, that is, who do you want to 
be when you grow up? This implies agency in the obtaining of something that is 
wanted – the self we might be. My argument in 2013 was that organizations tend to 
destroy those dreams, murdering many of those potential me’s. In that work, 
therefore, I assumed meaningful work was work that allowed the constitution of a 
desired identity, that is, work has meaning when it facilitates the constitution of  
selves we like and perhaps take pride in.  
However, I now think that those arguments, although qualified by exploring the 
place of friendship in the workplace and ways in which managerial controls are 
restricted, are too limited. The theory of organization that underpinned the 
discussion imagined ‘the’ organization as a place governed by management, but with 
spaces where escape from that ever-watchful eye was possible.  I argued that 
organizations are polytopias, that is, places containing multiple, overlapping spaces, 
only some of which are governed by management. This chapter builds on that 
account to develop a theory of how work, and the identities constituted through 
work, can be both meaningful and meaningless because work takes place in 
polytopic spaces into only some of which can management penetrate. I argue that 
meaningful work (identity) is achieved out of the orbit of the managerial gaze. I start 
by returning to Karl Marx’s early work to develop an account of ‘meaningful’ and 
‘meaningless’ work and the identities anticipated in Marx’s early thought, and then 
explore how people can be engaged in both, almost at the same time, because of the 
opportunities offered by polytopic spaces.  
Meaningful and meaningless workplace identities 
There are the seeds of ideas of what meaningful work might entail in early work by 
the young Karl Marx (1988) who, in his 26th year, wrote the scraps that remain of 
the 1844 Manuscripts.  He outlined a theory of a subject alienated from itself because 
of the conditions under which it must labour. Identity (as we call it today) emerged, 
for the young Marx, in the products of one’s labour. One projected one’s self into the 
products one made. Because, under capitalism, these products are taken away to be 
traded, one is (literally) alienated from the self who has been projected into the 
product.  It is this early theory that offers a fertile way of conceiving of 
meaningful/meaningless work.  
Marx did not limit his analysis to the making of a product. He argued that capitalism 
alienates the worker not only from her/himself, but also from their ‘species being’ 
and from their fellow (wo)men. To understand ‘species being’ think of a cow 
chewing the cud while grazing in a field all day. The cow exists only to exist; it 
labours (eats) to remain alive, but to be alive it is necessary that it eats.  It has no 
consciousness (so far as we are aware) over and above the need to continue 
chewing and grazing. It has no ‘conscious life-activity’ (Marx, 1988:76). The human, 
in contrast, is a species being that is conscious of her/his own existence, who can 
ponder on her/himself as if s/he were an object, and so s/he is a ‘Conscious Being’ 
(op cit). Wo/man does not exist in isolation from other people; s/he is necessarily 
an active participant in the species that is the human animal (77) and as such s/he 
contributes to the sustenance of humankind as a whole (77).  That is, s/he goes 
beyond her own immediate physical needs so as to contribute to the greater good, 
producing ‘the whole of nature’ (77). S/he ‘forms things in accordance with the laws 
of beauty’ (77).  This, then, is a theory of meaningful work. It takes the form of a 
social activity that produces goods and services that contribute to individual and 
general flourishing.  
Meaningless work is alienated work. Under capitalism (wo)man’s life activity is 
reduced to nothing more than a means of staying alive – s/he becomes like the cow, 
working only to sustain physical existence.  S/he moves but does not think, create, 
etc., etc. The worker ‘must sell himself and his human identity’ (1988:25) in order to 
survive.  Workers thus ‘sink .. to the level of a commodity’ (69), a commodity that 
they themselves produce through their labour and which is itself sold. This 
commoditised self, like any other commodity produced through labour, is an object 
in which work is ‘congealed’ or in which immaterial practices become material, that 
is, real, physical objects. So, for Marx, the conditions of capitalist organizations 
require that staff exist only to exist: embroiled in meaningless work, they are 
alienated. 
This theory resonated with my own early work experience. Before I became an 
academic I worked on the production lines of a factory making the innards for 
electrical machinery.  We were paid by ‘piece work’, that is, our pay was determined 
by how many capacitors we made. Reflecting back on that work now, I understand, 
on the one hand, that we existed only as extensions of machines that made 
meaningless products. We moved our hands, arms and feet and disengaged our 
minds – the work was so menial that it needed only the body’s extension of the 
machine at which it sat. The capacitors, sad little plastic and metal products that 
may have been useful in a finished product but that of themselves had no meaning,  
rolled down into the collecting trays and were taken away - alien objects that 
belonged to the employer.  But this was only part of the story. Marx’s arguments are 
that our ‘inner worlds’ were impoverished by work that required no thought, skill or 
imagination. To the observer, the women working on those ancient machines would 
be seen to be busily occupied in such very mundane activity that they could not 
produce anything that seemed meaningful or with the potential to contribute to the 
good of the community. On and on they went, one repetitive motion after another, 
producing 2,400 capacitors each day, 12,000 each week. The machine governed all 
our movements, it would seem.  
But that is to describe only one part of the activities in which we were engaged. Yes, 
at one level management’s reach was omnipotent: even the time we spent on toilet 
breaks was monitored. There was little scope for identity work, save as that that 
comes from being the appendage to a machine. But I also remember that, even while 
appearing to the observer as extensions of the machine, much more was going on 
than the mere making of capacitors. There was the making of social worlds and 
selves (and ‘species-being’) within the walls of the factory, with banter between the 
staff, laughter, friendship-making, and care. There was lots of gossip, cakes on 
birthdays, tricks played on those getting married, advice about difficult life 
situations, and so on. In other words, it was not only capacitors that were made in 
that factory, but social relationships and social selves. The products – capacitors - 
we manufactured contained nothing of ourselves, but even while tied to the 
machines we constituted a social world. It was through this social world that we 
constituted ourselves as a member of a ‘species’, that is, of working class women 
enjoying each other’s company (See Young and Wilmott, 1957/2013, for a 
discussion). It is this auto-biographical account that leads me to posit the possibility 
of being both alienated and non-alienated or, in contemporary parlance, engaged in 
both meaningless and meaningful work, and moving between abject, subordinated 
identities and social, recognition-full ones.  
Neoliberalism and meaningful work 
However, the shift from a manufacturing economy to a service-based one means 
that the types of work available today differ greatly from those of 30 or 40 years ago, 
and neoliberalist theories’ exploration of contemporary forms of work would seem 
to negate the possibility of there being any such possibility of escape from 
capitalism’s penetrating controls. Neoliberalism refers to an epoch in which 
economization spreads to spheres that previously were held to be separate and 
distinct from economics and markets (Harvey, 2003). It is ‘an order of normative 
reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality 
extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every 
dimension of human life’ (Brown, 2015, p. 30). Thus persons and states ‘are 
expected to comport themselves in ways that maximize their capital value in the 
present and enhance their future value … through practices of entrepreneurialism, 
self-investment, and/or attracting investors’ (Brown, 2015, p. 22). The self in 
neoliberal times is a project that has to be managed. No longer just someone who 
works for a firm, the self becomes a firm in itself, devoted to maximising its human 
capital. The self is penetrated to its very psyche, to the capillaries of its body, by 
capitalism.  
Neoliberalism is thus understood as a ‘culture’ that provides the organizing 
metaphors for whole spheres of life (Couldry, 2010). Not only is it a hegemonic 
theory of political economy (Harvey, 2005) it is also a ‘mobile, calculated technology 
for governing subjects who are constituted as self-managing, autonomous and 
enterprising (Gill and Scharff, 2011, p. 5), and also ‘rational, calculating and self-
motivating’ (ibid). Subjects are increasingly ‘exhorted to make sense of their 
individual biographies in terms of discourses of freedom, autonomy and choice – no 
matter how constrained their lives may actually be’ (op cit, p. 6). Neoliberalism’s 
tenacity is achieved, it is argued, through the production of active subjects seduced 
by such discourses, subjects who can best be understood as ‘artefacts’ rather than 
architects of neoliberalism (Larner, 2003). If so, then there is no possibility of being 
both alienated and non-alienated, as I argued above. 
But theories of neoliberalism are as totalising as Marxist theory. Neoliberalism 
suggests staff are super-alienated because they can only approach the products of 
their labour from the position of the consumer. Such a deterministic and monolithic 
model has been challenged by, amongst others, Walkerdine and Bansel (2010), who 
coined the phrase ‘super-alienated’. They illuminate the importance of 
understanding how ‘complex, relational and rhizomatic’ responses by individuals to 
neoliberalist modes of governance challenge such monolithic assumptions. The 
workers in Walkerdine and Bansel’s study were defined not only by neoliberalism, 
but by family, communities, socialities and other quotidian influences, so that the 
notion of ‘a stable neoliberalism that fixes a subject totally within its orbit’ unravels 
(p. 506).  
Indeed, following Butler (1990; 1993) we might argue that, there is not one self that 
is constructed while at work, but many selves, or there are numerous subject 
positions and individuals move from one to another to another, constituting notions 
of the self in each one as they move through them. Neo-liberal capitalism does not 
pin individuals, like butterflies, into one fixed position. The question follows: if 
capitalism or neoliberalism alienate a self from its self and there are several or many 
selves, which self is alienated from which? Are some forms of the self alienated, and 
others not? In other words, there is a need for a more sophisticated model of both 
the working subject and the organization within which that subject is constituted if 
we are to understand the forms that meaningful work may or may not take.  
The argument that follows is informed, although space allows it to be only an  
implicit influence, by Butler’s (1990; 1993; 1997; 2004) theories of the performative 
constitution of a subject as it moves within and through materially-located subject 
positions that are the stage on which recognition as a subject is granted. This 
requires unravelling the notion that organizational space is singular and fixed. I will 
argue that organizations are polytopias, or scenes of multiple, overlapping places 
that offer subject positions in which one may be engaged (almost) simultaneously in 
meaningless/alienating work-identities and meaningful/non-alienated work-
identities. That is, if organizational space/place is envisaged as multiple and fluid, 
then different forms of self-, identity-, work- and organization-making will take 
place within the same spaces/places.  I will argue that meaningful work is that 
which is undertaken in places that are out of sight of the managerial gaze.   
Meaningful work in polytopic organizational space 
The thesis of organizations as polytopic understands organizations as constituted 
within and through multiple, overlapping ‘I/spaces’ in which the same material 
space can afford numerous identities that in turn constitute numerous places (or 
emplacements) within and through that space. It was inspired by Lefebvre’s The 
Production of Space (1974/1991) although it departs radically from Lefebvre’s 
overall thesis. Lefebvre rejected Euclidian conceptions of space as something that 
exists in its own right. Think of an empty room: Euclidian space understands it as 
existing and awaiting occupation. Lefebvre (1974/1991) demurred. He reversed the 
concept of empty space as something existing prior to whatever ended up filling it, 
and argued that space is actively produced.  
Organizational space, following Lefebvre, is understood as both the medium and 
outcome of actions (Cairns et al, 2003; Kornberger and Clegg, 2004). Familiar spatial 
scales bundle together different ‘levels’ of space, such as organizational, local, 
regional, national, supranational and global, are not ‘natural geological foundations’ 
(Spicer, 2006, p.1470) but are socially produced, multiple scales constituted by 
actors engaging in political struggles. Such non-representational modes of 
theorising (Beyes and Steyaert, 2012; Massey, 2005; Soja, 1996) argue that there is 
no pre-existing or ‘a priori organization’, no ‘discrete and independent entity 
existing in one space-time framework’ (Jones et al, 2004:734).  In this ‘loss of 
cosmological innocence’ (Hansen, 2004:759) organizational space is understood 
through a performative perspective in which spatial orders are both constituted by 
and constitutive of participants. That is, organizational actors ‘do not simply “find” 
an arena, [but] construct it interactively’ (Haug, 2013:711). Importantly for this 
chapter’s arguments, at the same time ‘we do not simply occupy space, but rather 
become ourselves, in and through it’ (Tyler and Cohen, 2010:192), that is, material 
places and spaces form parts of the selves or identities of people as they, at the same 
time, constitute those spaces and places. It must not be forgotten that spaces and 
identities materialize and are materialized by power relations (Tyler and Cohen, 
2010).  
Just as Butler’s theories argue for a processual, performative understanding of the 
constitution of selves/identities, such non-representational theory argues against 
place and space as constant, singular and unitary. Space is, instead, conceived of as 
‘processual and performative, open-ended and multiple, practiced and of the 
everyday’ (Beyes and Steyaert, 2012:47), and, indeed, encompassing a proliferation 
of spaces and places. Rather than space we should study ‘spacing’ (Beyes and 
Steyaert, op cit), changing a vocabulary of ‘stasis, representation, reification and 
closure’ to one of ‘intensities, capacities and forces; rhythms, cycles, encounters, 
events, movements and flows; instincts, affects, atmospheres and auras; relations, 
knots and assemblages (ibid).  There are thus multiple spaces in which organization 
happens, each of which may be invested with diverse, unstable and multiple 
meanings (Halford and Leonard, 2006). This is a performative concept of space, of 
space as ‘becoming’. Thus, ‘organizations are but temporary reifications’ 
(Czarniawaska, 2004:780; see also Wapshott and Mallett, 2012).  
To understand this more clearly, I initially turned to Foucault’s thesis of heterotopias. 
Foucault, like Lefebvre, is specifically critical of Euclidian concepts of space: ‘we are not 
living in a homogeneous and empty space ….. (1994:177).  Rather, Foucault 
understands that space is multi-layered and constructed within conditions of power 
and ideology.  In this non-Euclidian perspective, an organization’s buildings are not 
empty spaces waiting to be filled up by staff and managers. Rather, the spaces of ‘the 
organization’ are actively constructed through the interactions of participants, 
ideologies, power, technologies, materialities and belief systems (Ford and Harding, 
2004).  
Foucault’s concept of heterotopias informs this thesis. He had made a passing 
observation about heterotopia in the Preface to The Order of Things (1989), in which 
he contrasted the comfortable fantasies of utopias with heterotopias that are 
‘disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language’ (1989:xix).  That is, 
heterotopias focus upon the insurrection of subjugated knowledges and provide a 
means of interrogating, and indeed revolting against, dominant, power-laden 
assumptions about space. Foucault understood heterotopias as ‘certain [spaces] that 
have the curious property of being connected to all the other emplacements, but in 
such a way that they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of relations that are 
designated, reflected, or represented by them’ (178).  They may offer challenges to 
power, or separate the ‘deviant’ from normative populations; they may articulate a 
society’s unarticulated belief systems, but be connected with temporal discontinuities, 
and be both open and closed at the same time. They may juxtapose in the same space 
several incompatible emplacements, or may challenge the entire conception of space 
and place.  
 
But although Foucault’s is a theory that has ‘disruptive, transient, contradictory and 
transformative implications’ (Genocchio, 1995:42) it is, by reason of its name – 
‘heterotopia’ - a theory of other, or different, spaces. This does not explain how it is 
possible to sit at a machine that governs one’s actions and at the same time be free 
of that machine, as I recounted above, so Foucault’s account takes us only so far in 
this argument.  That is, it is not a theory of polytopias, or emplacements that are not 
‘ontologically single, and therefore inhabited by a finally limited number of objects, 
forces and processes that may be more or less well known. …. In the midst of 
representational singularity there is multiplicity. But this is not seen. The multiple or 
the fractional, the elusive, the vague, the partial and the fluid are being displaced into 
Otherness’ (Law, 2004:137). In what follows, I develop a theory of polytopias that 
accounts for how it is possible to be seated in one space but at the same time occupy 
several, indeed numerous, placements in which identity/self-constitution, as well as 
meaningful/meaningless work, goes on (Steyeart, 2010).  This theory rests on six 
principles.  
 
Six principles of polytopias. 
The first principle is that the occupants of a space constitute it as emplacements in 
which they constitute selves/identities.  This is based on Foucault’s (1994) account of 
emplacements as locales where speaking subjects and space are co-emergent and, 
importantly for a theory of polytopias, that occupants of one material space may 
speak from several emplacements, constituting different perspectives of the self, of 
identities, as they do so.  Emplacements are constituted within a trialectic of power, 
knowledge and space (Soja, 1996).  
In these diverse, multiple and norm-governed emplacements, occupants, albeit 
unknown to each other, constitute both the organizational space and the self 
(Harding, 2007). Different organizational actors may perceive and conceive of the 
same space as very different emplacements. In Ford and Harding’s (2004) example 
of a hospital, nurses inhabited a village-like place, managers a grid that they traverse 
during their daily work, and chief executives a fantastic space in which complexity 
and size collapse into the simplicities (and manageability) of a small cottage hospital. 
Larner and le Heron’s (2005) study of changes in New Zealand’s higher education 
system offer a similar conclusion. They argue that ‘imaginaries’, or the fantasies of 
those with power about what a sector should be, constitute both spaces and 
subjectivities through calculative practices; these constitute norms of practice that 
inform both the construction of material space and the occupants who occupy that 
space. 
The second principle states that the entrance and exits of managers transforms 
emplacements (and thus selves) through the workings of power. To develop this 
principle (and others that follow) I will draw on an empirical example from an 
interview with someone I will call the Worker, one of a series of ad hoc interviews 
that aim to explore varieties of working lives, who worked in a mail sorting office 
alongside ‘up to 500 people’.  
As seen in other studies (Anthony, 1986; Stewart et al, 1994) managers are often 
absent from this Worker’s place of work: ‘his duties will take him somewhere else, you 
know, so now he’s here, now he’s not here’. His account shows that spaces are 
constituted very differently according to the presence or absence of the manager. 
When the manager is present workers stay at their workstations, and ‘you become 
more active, so less talking, less socialising’ in an attempt to ‘keep on top of’ the work. 
He describes how, when managers are present, emotions are negative. There is 
suspicion: 
the numbers of managers have gone up in the last couple of years … the higher 
management wants to recruit more managers and then if the workforce go on 
strike … they can utilise the managers to get the work through … and so [they 
learn how to do our work]. 
And loathing: 
[One manager’s] entire body language is so full of malignancy …, he’s so vicious 
in his posture. People hate him when he’s stood [behind] their back, and he likes 
to be where he shouldn’t be  ….. People don’t feel comfortable, because why is he 
here, why is he looking at us, like we owe something to him? 
So when a manager enters into the sorting room staff focus on the tasks of sorting 
the mail. The Worker describes himself and his colleagues when in management’s 
presence as ‘robots’, or denigrated and abject beings, who must focus solely on 
getting the job done while managers are watching them.  
But when there are no managers present The Worker’s tasks change and the social 
interactions of the workplace take precedence. He talks to people ‘about work and 
talking about management you know how cunning and how vicious they are, so I’ll 
drip some vitriol into the conversation’. Such talk, he says, is necessary to his sense of 
self: ‘I am not a robot, …..  I would wilt and wither if I don’t talk to people’. But also, he 
argues, the social side of work is vital because ‘we’ve got all the week to go so unless 
everyone stays in a good mood and keeps our chins up’ then ‘If you don’t feel happy …. 
[it] causes a lot of trouble at work’. So ‘I find the time… to wheel round containers 
[and] stop by let’s say for 30 seconds to say ‘hello’ or ‘how are they doing’, also 
sometimes [say] something funny you know and they will burst out into a fit of 
laughter and you know my job done, and then move on to other people ……..   But for 
me it’s important that people are smiling and laughing and so that’s a typical day’.   
It can be seen that the very same material space transmogrifies into different 
emplacements as managers enter and leave. The Worker thus moves between two 
very different spaces, albeit within the same material place, and as he moves the self 
who speaks changes: a different subject with a different identity emerges.  In one he 
speaks as the objectified, denigrated worker denied recognition of himself as 
anything other than the mere appendage of a machine, a machine to which he is tied, 
unable to move out of its orbit. In the other he moves away from the machine and 
speaks as a subject who finds pleasure (and thus I suggest, meaning) in a working 
life that allows him to constitute himself as ‘a species being’.  
The third principle is that each emplacement is governed by different norms and 
regulations. 
Continuing with the above example, and my own remembered experience, the 
norms that govern a space when managers are present is that managerial orders 
must be obeyed, and those orders are concerned with maximising production.  
Managers must watch over staff, in the sense of ensuring they are conforming with 
rules and regulations. Staff, on the other hand, must conform with the norms of 
hierarchy and give the impression of being focused totally upon the achievement of 
workplace objectives. As we have seen, when managers are present the Worker 
follows the rules: he occupies a fixed place, by the machine, and his focus is on the 
officially ordained task of sorting the mail. His identity is abject, no more than that of 
a robot. When managers are absent, the Worker has the freedom to walk around, 
and the focus turns to the social world of the workplace where the identities that 
become available are those of social beings engaged in ensuring mutual (albeit 
constrained) flourishing.  
It follows (the fourth principle) that what is regarded as deviant and what is 
regarded as normative change as the place shape-shifts. The notion that staff can 
wander around, sharing a joke and engaging in conversation, so not focusing on 
maximising efficiency or output, would be totally alien in manager-governed space. 
Similarly, the worker who focuses totally on working as hard as possible in the 
absence of managers would be regarded as deviant by fellow occupants of that 
emplacement, as numerous studies starting with the Hawthorne Studies (Mayo, 
1949) have shown.  
Thus, fifth, each space has its own regime of emotions, embodiment, self- and identity-
making. In the worker’s account affect in manager-dominated space is described as 
negative (frustration and anger), but it switches to one of laughter and sociality in 
worker-dominated space.  The very materiality of the body seems to change when 
managers enter and leave. In one space the body must adapt itself to the demands of 
the machine, while in another it is freer and can move away from the machine that 
otherwise governs its every movement. 
It follows (Principle 6) that there are different conceptions of ‘work’ in each space. 
This example shows that how work is conceived shifts as different emplacements 
come to occupy the same place. The Worker may be situated in exactly the same 
position, bounded by the same walls and working with the same machinery, but 
when managers are present the space is management-governed, and work is 
defined within a managerialist frame that requires a focus on the maximising of 
output, efficiency, production, etc. When managers are absent, the conception of 
work expands to incorporate the sociality of the workplace. Work here is carried out 
as part of a social world in which relationship-building and maintenance is included 
in the unwritten job description. 
Discussion: towards a theory of making work and identity meaningful in the 
organizational quotidian   
The examples I have used to develop this theory of organizations as polytopias, or 
multiple emplacements within single material spaces, has focused on only one 
material space with only two co-existent emplacements. Even at this simple level it 
can be seen that work emplacements are labile and fissile: staff move fluidly from 
moment to moment into and out of different emplacements as if into and out of 
different dimensions, and as they do so their possible selves or identities shift and 
change. 
But the major arguments derived from this theory, in relation to accounts of 
meaningful work, is that meaningful work and the identities it makes possible is not 
absent from contemporary workplaces but rather, under the weight of management 
theory and practice, and indeed of critical analysis, remains hidden. ‘Meaningful work’, 
in this account, refers to the areas of freedom that are carved out, moment to moment, 
in the absence of managers, so that ‘work’ is defined by those doing the work rather 
than by management. This is a self-governing identity. The self may be alienated from 
its self when in an emplacement subject to the managerial gaze. At that time the ‘I’ 
becomes an extension of the machine, located in a web of managerial rules and norms. 
But when that managerial gaze is absent and the worker moves into a different 
emplacement, the self that is constituted is a social self that emerges through 
interactions with others within the physical, but not psychical, confines of ‘the 
organization’. The ‘product’ that is achieved while in that space is not so much what 
the employer demands, although that may be produced too, but a self as a ‘species 
being’ that contributes to the flourishing of the people gathered together in that 
material place.  
I am thus suggesting that in the conditions of neoliberal capitalism, ‘meaningful work’ 
and the identities it facilitates is something that is defined and constituted by the 
worker when unconstrained by managerial presence.  It is achieved through various 
forms of meaning-making. In my own memory of what appeared to be a totally-
governed workplace, and that of the Worker whose account I’ve given above, meaning 
emerged through social interactions, through ‘species being’. ‘Meaningful work’ here 
then refers to the ability to socialise with other people, and thus to achieve recognition 
and identity (Butler, 1991; 1993) and a sense of self. In other workplaces or for other 
people ‘meaningful work’ may be defined differently, but it would be something 
worked on outside the norms or rules that constrain the possibilities for being and 
becoming in that particular organization.  It co-exists with meaningless, alienated work, 
that is, it occurs the same material place but in a very different emplacement. This 
‘meaningful identity constitution at work’ is a social activity that contributes to 
individual and general flourishing of the people working together. ‘Seeing’ 
workplaces in this way as polytopias involves an ontological politics (Law, 2006) 
that strives to avoid unwittingly repressing what ‘fails to fit the standard package of 
common-sense realism’ (op cit, p. 10).  Rather, this theory of polytopias opens 
possibilities for conceiving of ontological multitudes, and understanding how 
meaningful work emerges despite neoliberalist capitalism’s attempts to quash it.  
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